This paper investigates the continuing relationships between Australian, Indonesian and Indian unionists and activists in the aftermath of an intense political struggle in Australia from 1945 to 1949 in support of Indonesian independence. These groups had been brought together initially by intersections between the networks established through colonialism, like trade unions, communism and feminism, with those having much longer histories, like Islam. The men and women in this Australian setting expressed their vision in 1945 for a future of universal and transnational networks across the Indian Ocean which would continue the alliances they had found so fruitful. Their experiences as well as their hopes can be called cosmopolitanism and were 'southern' in the sense that they drew on subaltern, non-western and/or anti-colonial networks in all three countries. Although these hopes for new futures of universal alliances and collaborations were held passionately in the 1940s, all seem to have died by 1970, diverted by newly independent national trajectories and defeated by the Cold War. Yet many of the relationships persisted far longer than might be expected and their unravelling was not inevitable. This paper will trace the course of a few of the relationships which began in the heat of the campaigns in Australia, 1943Australia, to 1945, in order to identify the continuing common ground as well as the rising tensions which challenged them.
identified Islam as a structure entirely outside European control within which such networks were formed. Yet what is notable about each of these networks is that they drew not only from pre-colonial and non-western technologies and ideas but at the same time from those initiated from Europe. Although he was only marginally interested in Europe, Tagore travelled on the vessels of European empires in order to explore the Asian cultural worlds he was hoping to bring together. Islam had gained from the new transport networks established by colonisation, both through the cultural influences of the expanding numbers of steam ship crews who were often Muslims and through the ships themselves, which offered new and cheaper routes to the Haj for far flung Muslim communities established by the earlier sailing traders. The networks of mobile working people, whether among indentured labourers or the seafaring lascars (largely from India) and seedies (Arabic-speakers from Aden) (Ewald 2000) had all arisen from the economies and technologies of empire, even though they built some of their relationships on the older ties of language and local home cultures as well as new industrial conditions and strategies. The relationships between men and women across cultures arising in port cities through sea transport, although long established with sail, had been greatly accelerated in the age of expanding Imperial trade and proliferating steam ship routes (Falkiner 2008) .
Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.3, No.3, 2011 111 Finally, there were organizational structures like international conferences and regular newsletters which had been initiated in the political movements of the west, like Marxism and feminism, but which drew in and linked non-western peoples. The ideas of these political movements had been challenged and reshaped as they circulated in colonised settings where non-western 'universalisms' existed alongside assertive new local cultural movements. The international organisations of the 1920s deemed 'communist' for example, like the League Against Imperialism, were often seen by western commentators as being entirely under western -in this instance, Soviet -domination. But they can be seen to have operated like the material structures of the shipping lanes, in that they formed structures -although intellectual structures rather than material ones -which acted as conduits for flows of debate and contestation in many directions, not just from Europe to the colonised world.
The hopes for new futures of universal alliances and collaborations were held passionately in the 1940s, yet all seem to have died by 1970. The bitter struggles to force out colonisers led to national identities which were inward-looking, as newly independent peoples tried to define and authenticate themselves, as well as to justify their new borders. Hampering transnationalism as well was the fact that borders continued to be problematic after Independence. In the Dutch East Indies, for example, there had been deep ambivalence from the earliest years of the twentieth century in a number of communities, including among the Sumatrans and the Javanese, about whether their emerging 'nation' should embrace all of the islands in the archipelago which had been controlled by the Dutch, despite religious and ethnic differences, and indeed whether it should include the Malay population of British Malaya (Zurbuchen 2005; Kumar 1979; Anderson 1979; Reid 1979 ).
This ambivalence and debate continued to be unresolved -at least in part -because even after 1949, the Dutch retained control over Irian Jaya, 2 2 Known by various names, including Dutch New Guinea and West Papua. a place which had long held emotional significance for nationalists because it was where the Dutch had imprisoned many Indonesian political prisoners, including Haji Misbach, the 'red haji of Solo', a high profile communist member of Serakat Islam, in 1924 and over 1300 Communist Party activists and others in 1927 (McVey 1965 Shiraishi 1990; Ricklefs 2001; Federspiel 2006) . Although its population was Melanesian, Irian Jaya had no greater differences in ethnicity and religion than did other islands now included in the new independent Republic. Hostilities between the Indonesians and the Dutch over Irian Jaya had flared into international consciousness by the early 1950s as we shall see. Inside Indonesia there was intense popular anger that even after such a bloody independence battle in the 1940s the Dutch continued to be intransigent in holding onto their last foothold of colonialism. This ensured that, despite ambivalence inside Indonesia over the challenges of extending the borders, the Indonesian government demanded that the UN declare incorporation into the Indonesian nation and eventually invaded Irian Jaya in 1961. Border insecurity and nationalist assertiveness was not limited to Indonesia. In India, bitterness over the border with Pakistan was paralleled by rising conflict with China over the borderline on the north east. India stationed armed troops there and increasingly severe border clashes marked the later 1950s until open warfare broke out in 1962. At the same time, Cold War politics on all sides had forced everyone -still colonised or not -to recompose themselves in regional and political 'camps' or 'blocs' as the hostile polarisations lined up through the 1950s. All these were ongoing processes, generating occasional peaks of crisis but often simmering, yet still shaping both internal and international political relationships.
There were also, however, some obvious landmarks of sudden change which are usually used as explanations. There was the end of the world war itself in May 1945, then Indian Independence in 1947 and the tragedy of Partition, which split the memberships of at least some unions like those for the seafarers who had sailed as Indians but who lived across all sides of the borders of India, and West and East Pakistan. The Indonesian battle against the Dutch went on for far longer -and was accompanied by much more internal bloodshed among the nationalists -than had been expected in August 1945. Independence was finally achieved only in December 1949, after years of isolation behind a Dutch blockade. In Australia, there had been rising conflict between left and right inside the Labour movement, with pressure on left members and organisations to declare their distance from the Australian Communist Party (CPA) and withdraw from all Soviet-aligned international organisations.
Labor lost the election in December 1949 to Robert Menzies, who led a deeply conservative government to power for 23 years, entrenching an alignment with the USA in the Cold War hostilities.
Were these abrupt events -dramatic as each was -enough to sever the alliances formed during the campaign against the Dutch? Many of the networks in existence in 1945 persisted in fact into the 1950s and even the 1960s, beyond these major landmarks. This paper will briefly trace three of these intersections between non-western and western networks. The first is the relationship between Islam and communism. The second is around trades union organisation and strategies in established and newly independent nations. The third is around gender and sexual relationships across racial lines, the area far less often investigated than the other two in the recent scholarship on cosmopolitanism (cf Stivens 2008), yet arguably one which was sustained the longest. There are publications around some of these themes, but most are focussed within national borders, seldom drawing international comparisons. Each of these intersections was visible in 1945 in the Australian campaign to support Indonesian independence and they can be seen to exist, with varying degrees of tension, in events up to the 1960s.
The campaign in Australia to support the Indonesian declaration of an Independent Republic in August 1945 was carried out through a boycott of Dutch shipping (Lockwood 1982; Fitzpatrick and Cahill 1981; Cottle 2003; Beasley 1996; Goodall 2008; Cottle and Keys 2005) initiated by Indonesian seamen and activists caught in or brought to Australia when the Japanese invaded Dutch East Indies in 1942. It was then taken up by Australian maritime unions and others including the Indian Seamen's Union in Australia (ISUiA). These unions all refused to load, service or crew any Dutch shipping or other shipping carrying arms or supplies to the Dutch. The boycott was spectacularly effective, holding up around 500 ships in Australian waters for nine months and completely stopping the Dutch and British in that period from re-establishing colonial power over what had been Netherlands East Indies (Lockwood 1982) . The Dutch ramped up their physical attack on the Indonesian Republican areas and then imposed a naval blockade around them, but the Independence movement continued to call for support from governments they believed to be sympathetic in Australia, Vietnam, India and the Philippines (Raliby quoted in Anderson 1976, p.179) . Although less uniformly observed by 1947, the boycott continued to act as a significant obstruction to Dutch supply lines and as a constant reminder to the Australian public of the battle going on to their north.
The campaign brought together not only Australians and the Indonesian seafarers and political activists but involved all the seamen, from many nationalities, who were temporary residents in Australia, because they were the crews on the foreign vessels, including the Dutch and British, which were being used to reinforce the Dutch as they tried to retake the NEI (Lockwood 1982, p.170; Cottle 2003) . These seafarers included Chinese, Vietnamese and Papuan sailors, but most notable were the Indians who were in the greatest numbers, crewing all of the British and many of the Dutch ships.
3 Often stereotyped by later Australian authors (Fitzpatrick and Cahill 1981) as subservient workers and unreliable allies, the Indians played a key role in the strike. They were not only highly unionised and militant in India itself (Broeze 1981) but formed a union for themselves while in Australian waters, the ISUiA which has left many documents to record the Indian views and statements about the strike.
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This article, addressing the years 1945 to 1965, will focus on the ongoing relationships between Indonesians and Australians, as the Indians appear to have taken a less active role on the international stage in those years. 5 Yet the Indian experience forms an essential comparative backdrop in considering the interactions between Indonesians and Australians, particularly in relation to Islam, which otherwise might be interpreted very differently.
Intersection 1: Islam and Communism
The rapidity with which ideas around socialism from the 1880s and then communism after the Russian Revolution were circulating globally owed much to the travels of colonised peoples for trade, education or business into Europe as well as into the rest of the colonised world. Most of the high profile advocates of anti-colonial and nationalist movements from the colonised world had spent some time in their respective metropolitan countries or in other European centres. Often this was in events or conferences which were associated with the and emerging communist parties in the colonies -and in fact would have had had great difficulty imposing any single 'line' even then on the tumultuous ferment of ideas which was being debated and circulated between the anti-colonial and nationalist movements both in
European cities and in their homelands (Manjapra 2010a, pp.167-170; Manjapra 2010b Java, or were strongly sympathetic to socialist and communist policies and strategies (McVey 1965, pp.172-3; Shiraishi 1990; Ricklefs 2001; Federspiel 2006) . Tan Malaka (1894 -1949 was a Sumatran who was a committed nationalist and communist, studying in the (Malaka 1922) .'
This position was rejected in Moscow just as it was by many western Communists, but it had a powerful resonance in India, particularly among the unionised seafarers from Bengal who formed a major proportion of those in Sydney in 1945. Historian Suchetana Chattopadhyay has traced the emergence of Bengal's first communists in the early 1920s from the region's Muslim intelligentsia (Chattopadhyay 2011, pp. 1-6) . The Communist Party of India continued to have a significant proportion of Muslims, and it was influential during the 1920s and 1930s in the seamen's unions operating in the two big ports of the region, Bombay and Calcutta (Chattopadhyay 2011, pp. 178-9, 218 For the Australians most directly involved in the ISUiA, like Clarrie Campbell, the seafarers' commitment to Islam was obvious and they took it seriously. Campbell assisted in compiling a list of the names and addresses of Sydney's Muslim community in 1946 to be invited to attend the Eid celebrations which the ISUiA hosted and to compose the respectful letters of invitation in English which the Union issued. In wider circles, however, among the largely atheist left of the Union movement and the Communist and Socialist parties, the Indian seamen's diverse faiths were noted but assumed to be unimportant. Australians interviewed for this project confirmed they were aware of religious differences largely because there were problems whenever the Australians tried to organise food purchases or cooking. They learnt quickly that things went far more smoothly when the seafarers themselves managed the strikers' kitchen for all traditional food requirements -Christian, Muslim and Hindu. Australian observers of the seafarers' tactful management of dietary differences were delighted at what they took to be a growing 'ecumenism' among the striking seamen which would involve, as reductivist versions of Marx advocated, the eventual 'withering away' of organised religion. At most, these Australians saw such religious differences as quaint and outmoded customs. For many of the Indians and the Indonesians, however, the role of Islam in fostering international unity among Muslims was extremely important. The Indians pointed out in November 1945:
"The Indonesians are 98% Mohammedan and the Indian seamen in Sydney are 98% Mohammedans," said one Indian spokesman. "Thus the shipping companies are trying to force us to take part in a war on our brother Mohammedans. This is against our conscience, as well as being against the law" (Tribune, 30 October 1945).
A group of Indian crewman after refusing to sail a Dutch ship said:
"We made our attitude quite clear. We were simply not going to Java and help suppress our brothers, and that as all there was to it." (Tribune, 2 November 1945). Differences in Empires, languages and shipping lines had kept the Indians and Indonesians separated in the past, although the Indian seafarers commented bitterly that they believed this was due to the shipping companies seeking to 'divide and rule'. One Indian organizer put it this way when he spoke formally to the Indonesians at a shared function:
We Indians are indeed grateful that you accepted our invitation to join us in this picnic today. We feel that in doing so, we have welded a chain of fraternal friendship which no force can break . . . In the past there have been small conflicts between Indian and Indonesian seamen . . . We know now that in spite of the urgency of winning the war, certain shipping companies in their greed for profits, and even at the risk of losing the war, were prepared to use the people of one country against another . . . The unity of our people, the people of two important countries . . . ensures our ultimate emancipation.
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At this event in Sydney, both groups pledged that in the future they would put aside such colonisers' divisions and instead concentrate on the bonds of religion and class politics which rightly drew them together.
In India and Indonesia, however, the relationship between the Communist Parties and As a member of the WFTU Transport Division, containing not only seamen but railway aircraft workers, he included them in his speeches but his focus was always on the maritime industry.
He was also devoted to maintaining an international communist network, and although not uncritical of Stalin, he put up a steely defence against the conservative Australian government's attempts all through the 1950s to have the SUA disaffiliate from the WFTU.
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In all his defences of the International network, he stressed the importance of alliances and collaboration with the maritime unionists of Asia and particularly of Indonesia. argued that -for Indonesia just as much as for Australia -it was essentially class analysis which would offer solutions and so alliances between fellow working class unions, through the WFTU, was the way to gain external support.
There were two key differences between Tuk Subianto's and Elliott's positions at this time.
The first was that Elliott failed to notice the Indonesian union's interest in campaigns to achieve cultural goals like recognition of Eid at the end of Ramadan as an important holiday.
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Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.3, No.3, 2011 The second was that Elliott failed to discuss the building of links between decolonising nations. For him, the priority was to support the centralised international organisation, whereas for Tuk Subianto, the priority was seeking out and consolidating bonds between decolonising and newly independent workers, with the WFTU as a secondary -although highly important -set of alliances. Although these were, even in 1953, important differences, they were outweighed by the extensive common ground between the two men and their two union's positions. They spent the next several years in close communication and international collaboration.
The structure through which this could occur was the WFTU, originally established in the UK as a global network between unions, it had become more Soviet-aligned when it was opposed by a newly formed body, the anti-communist ITF, which concentrated its attention on the emerging Cold War in Europe. The WFTU had developed a strong set of partnerships with the Trade Unions of the non-western and newly independent nations. Although based in
Eastern Europe, and meeting in Prague and Vienna, the WFTU nevertheless sustained a flow of news from many parts of the globe, including Japan, India, Ceylon and various countries in Africa. However, when the minutes of WFTU meetings are studied, it becomes apparent that the only representatives of these non-western Trade Unions who were consistently present at meetings and were regularly sending updates, reports and proposals, were those from Indonesia. 14 It was essentially the Indonesians who gave some reality to the important claim of the WFTU to have a non-European membership.
While Elliot was sustaining his communication with the WFTU and with Tuk Subianto, his union came under increasing political and legal attack from the conservative Menzies Government, leading it to reduce its international involvement and focus instead on defending itself against the relentless industrial campaigns of the government. There had been other major events for the decolonising world in the period before the SUA Certainly in 1956, Tuk Subianto and Eliot V. Elliott were demonstrating that they were having real conversations. Their speeches and reports show they had much common ground between them, including a commitment to understanding social conflict as class struggle, although while this was important for Tuk Subianto, it was the dominant theme for Elliott.
Each felt that seamen were both in need of international solidarity but were also uniquely able to contribute to building a new, internationalised world. And each advocated the achievement of strong national independence and identity as a goal for all countries.
Yet there were also indications of dissonance in 1956. As Tuk Subianto appeared to be uneasily aware, Australians had failed to recognise the primacy of continued struggle against for which the Australian unions had fought. The SUA was actually battling the companies which had made these employment decisions, but the challenge the union faced was whether it could keep its campaign rhetoric focussed on the companies rather than on the exploited employees with whom its members were being forced into competition. Could the SUA sustain the relationships which had been built up over the last two decades with Asian Trades As containerized cargo-handling escalated, job losses spiralled and the government continued its relentless attack with penal clauses applied to unionists and massive fines to the union.
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Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.3, No.3, 2011 The SUA succumbed: the old racist approaches to defensive unionism, which had not been visible at all in the Seamen's Journal over the previous decades, again came to dominate the pages of the union's newspaper. (Breckenridge et al. 2002; Stivens 2008) .
Australia in the 1940s: recognising the personal and the political
If the Indian side of the story about the boycott of Dutch shipping has been obscured,
18
18 Fitzpatrick and Cahill, 1981 , Beasley, 1996 , Ivens 1946 -but NOT Lockwood 1982 (who just dismembered it and spread it across the narrative in such a way as to make it hard to find) the presence of women has been completely invisible except for the stellar roles of two taking on a role in operating the radio to receive broadcasts from the Republican government and writing the press releases to circulate the news. She married Bondan and they began a life together which continued when she joined him in Indonesia where she remained for the rest of her life.
The other major group of Australian women, like Lotte Maramis, became involved with Indonesians when the young men exiled in Australia when the Japanese invaded were invited socially to their family homes. All groups of Indonesians, those accidentally caught and those like the ex-Digulists who had been brought by the Dutch, were eventually able to mix relatively freely with Australians in a number of towns and cities all along the eastern seabord, which opened up social and cultural interactions which had not been known in Australia for many decades, if at all. Lotte fell in love with Anton Maramis and married him with her family's support, although she battled much antagonism from the broader Australian public she encountered (Maramis 2006, pp.5-36) . Many other young Australian women faced strong opposition from families and friends to the decisions they made to marry their Indonesian fiancés and return with them to their homes once Independence had been declared. As Lingard has documented (2008, pp.237-248) , for some of these women the marriages were not successful in such different environments. But for others -and Lotte and
Molly were not alone -these relationships proved strong enough to embrace and flourish in the very different society and cultures they found in Indonesia.
These relationships generated ongoing networks in those situations where communication continued. Molly and Lotte, for example, both became journalists who sent news of the newly independent Indonesia out to the broader English speaking world, offering another perspective to add to the stories of the exiting Dutch but also to the emerging voices of Indonesians themselves on the world stage, including women.
The third group of women in Australia were the Indonesian wives and daughters of the political prisoners who had been in Boven Digul and had been brought to Australia by the Dutch. Lingard has written about Siti Chamsinah, the daughter of an ex-Digulist who lived in
Mackay, who came to Melbourne to train as a nurse. Even as young woman in the 1940s, Siti made clear her opposition to Dutch rule and, as Lingard discovered when she met her many years later in Indonesia, she had remained a strong-minded and thoughtful woman all her life (Lingard 2008, pp.97-98) . We do not know what became of the other Indonesian women who had been associated with Boven Digul and returned to the new Republic -this remains to be followed up in later research. What is clear is that as women's organisations took shape after Independence in Indonesia, they began to look for international networks.
In 1950 Gerwis was been formed from an amalgamation of six small women's organisations across Java. It had an association with the PKI, although not a direct affiliation and it did not always follow PKI advice. It was chastised by the PKI in 1951, for example, for concerning itself with 'political' issues like opposition to the Dutch retention of West Irian, instead of focussing on the local and everyday concerns of non-elite women. Gerwis defied the party by continuing to express this concern and seemed happy to have a distance from the Party.
Internationally, Gerwis looked to the WIDF, (the International Federation of Democratic Women) which had been formed in Paris in 1945. The WIDF became a Soviet-aligned body in the turmoil as the Cold War took shape, in a way not dissimilar to that of the World Federation of Trades Unions (WFTU) which had begun as a British-based global body but, after being abandoned by the anti-communist unions, had ended up aligned to the Soviets (Lewis 2003) . In Australia, the body aligned with the WIDF was the Union of Australian Women (UAW) a left leaning organisation which included members of the CPA but was also joined by women of a wide range of other affiliations (Curthoys and McDonald 1966) . One of the key members of the UAW was Jessie Street, who had been also a founding member of the Australian Indonesian Association (Hardjono and Warner 1995, p.19 ).
The link was made between Gerwis and the UAW at least as early as March 1954, when the Australian women's organisation was formally invited to attend the second congress of the Indonesian women's movement (Curthoys and McDonald 1966, pp. 36-7; Hindley 1964, pp. 203-5) . The WIDF sent delegates as well and at this meeting, the Indonesian organisation changed its name to Gerwani to reflect its decision to address the interests of women of all classes, religions and ethnic affiliations. This was a significant step -as Tan (Hindley 1964; Wieringa 1993 Wieringa , 2002 . These were consistent with the goals of the WIDF which stressed education and maternal and child health in all their campaigns.
This diversity of interests and affiliations was a hallmark of the UAW as well, despite its The organisation as a whole was said to have been complicit in the initial, alleged coup in which six army generals were abducted and murdered. Gerwani members were accused of enacting obscene tortures and of castrating each of the men. Not only was this accusation never substantiated, or even pursued in later trials when the women were charged with different offences, but the autopsies on the generals demonstrated there had not been any castration (Wieringa 2002 ). Yet the accusations were widely believed.
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The imprisoned Gerwani women, after suffering torture and rape, were eventually released, 'You don't have to believe in karma to see what the social consequences of that awful millstone of murders and injustices around our necks could be. Well, we'll just have to work through our national karma!' (Hardjono and Warner 1995, p.142) .
The writing that Lotte Maramis and Molly Bondan did publish has given Australians and other English-speaking readers many glimpses they would not otherwise have had of life in Indonesia. They could not overcome, however, the chasm that opened up after the violence of 1965 had severed the most active ongoing connections which Australian women had with Indonesian women. The UAW reported sadly in Our Women that Gerwani had been closed down and this put an end to the mutual visits between the UAW and women's movement in Indonesia (Our Women, vol.29, p.12) .
……………..
Conclusion
Returning to compare these 'southern' cosmopolitanisms as they frayed apart, there may only be tentative conclusions to draw. not inevitable, no matter how unproblematic it appeared to be to Australians. The Indian comparison must return our focus to the need for research into the specific conditions which opened up and then perpetuated that breech in Indonesia because it did not occur in India.
In the interactions we can trace -largely those between Australians and Indonesians -there seem to have been a useful roles played by the universalist European-origin structures which had been generated by international communism, international trade union networks and the international women's movement. Of the two latter structures -the left wing organisations the WFTU and the WIDF -there appears to have been far greater diversity in the International Women's movement and as well to be more flexibility in responding to the perspectives of those from outside any one country. This may reflect the levels of relative power represented by the two groups -the Trades Unions for example were clearly often bearing the brunt of the policies of national governments, whereas in Australia at least, the women's movement was not in this position. Being marginal to the main power struggles of the day allowed the women's organisations to respond more rapidly and more innovatively to the perspectives of those international or cross-cultural groups with whom they might be in close touch.
Yet in the cases where the European structures did offer a useful platform for meeting and communicating, it was always the case that decolonising country delegates like those from Indonesia felt the need to challenge these bodies. It was only pressure from the Indonesian and delegates from other decolonising nations in both organisations which led them to open up some of their policies and programs to revision. The demands to pay more attention to the needs of non-western and non-urban workers were examples of the ways in which people like Tuk Subianto and the Gerwani delegates could reshape those European-origin networks so they became much more genuinely a place of refuge and support for campaigning 'southern' working people.
At a personal level, the meetings and conferences of those international structures offered opportunities for people like Tuk Subianto and Eliot V. Elliott to stay in touch and to talk over their common ground. The events in each home country -shaped and responding to both external 'Cold War' pressures but also local dynamics and demands -eventually widened the gap between old comrades. Ultimately, rapidly changing economic conditions and then the catastrophic violence of warfare and massacre had severed the last links.
However, it is clear that some of these personal bonds in 1945 had proved to be able to Researchers engaged in interdisciplinary and/or multidisciplinary work in areas such as social and environmental action, community capacity, migration and cultural diversity, and those aiming to inform policy-making for social and cultural sustainability are encouraged to contribute. These are compiled by guest editors by arrangement.
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